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Abstract—The performance of an energy system under a real-
time pricing mechanism depends on the consumption behavior
of its customers, which involves uncertainties. In this paper, we
consider a system operator that charges its customers with a
real-time price that depends on the total realized consumption.
Customers have unknown and heterogeneous consumption pref-
erences. We propose behavior models in which customers act
selfishly, altruistically or as welfare-maximizers. In addition,
we consider information models where customers keep their
consumption levels private, communicate with a neighboring set
of customers, or receive broadcasted demand from the operator.
Our analysis focuses on the dispersion of the system performance
under different consumption models. To this end, for each pair
of behavior and information model we define and characterize
optimal rational behavior, and provide a local algorithm that
can be implemented by the consumption scheduler devices.
Analytical comparisons of the two extreme information models,
namely, private and complete information models, show that
communication model reduces demand uncertainty while having
negligible effect on aggregate consumer utility and welfare.
In addition, we show the impact of real-time price policy
parameters have on the expected welfare loss due to selfish
behavior affording critical policy insights.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response management (DRM) emerges as a promi-
nent method to alleviate the complications in power balancing
caused by uncertainties both on the consumer and the supply
side. Changes in user consumption preferences create the
uncertainty on the consumer side while the uncertainty on the
supply side is due to renewable resources. DRM refers to the
system operator’s effort to improve system performance by
shaping consumption through pricing policies. Smart meters
that can control the power consumption of customers, and
enable information exchange between meters and the system
operator (SO) provide the infrastructure to implement these
policies.
Real-time pricing (RTP) is a pricing policy where the price
depends on instantaneous consumption of the population [1]–
[3]. In RTP, the SO shares part of the risk and reward with its
customers by setting price based on the total consumption.
In these models, it is natural to propose game-theoretic
models of consumption behavior, where users strategically
reason about the behavior of others to anticipate price and
determine their individual consumption [1]–[8]. The specifics
of the behavior model and the information available impact
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the system welfare and is critical in assessing the benefits
or disadvantages of a pricing scheme [8], [9]. Given an
RTP mechanism, our goal in this paper is to characterize
rational price-anticipatory behavior models under different
information exchange schemes, and comparatively assess their
impact on system performance measures.
We consider an RTP scheme in which customers agree to a
price function that increases linearly with total consumption
and that depends on an unknown renewable energy parameter
(Section II-A). The individual customer utility at each time
depends on the individual’s consumption preference and price
both of which are in general unknown to others (Section II-B).
Initially, the SO sends public information on its estimate of
population’s consumption preferences and renewable source
generation. Customers use the public information and their
self-preferences to anticipate total consumption and renewable
source’s effect on price, and respond rationally by consuming
according to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) strategy.
In [10], based on this energy market model, we propose
and show the effectiveness of a peak-to-average ratio (PAR)-
minimizing pricing strategy.
In this paper we explore the effects of different consumer
behavior models, where consumers respond rationally regard-
ing their individual utility, the population’s aggregate utility
or the welfare (Section II-C). As time progresses, past con-
sumption decisions contain information about the preferences
of others which individuals can use to make more informed
decisions in the current time. Based on this observation, we
propose three information exchange models, namely, private,
action-sharing and broadcast (Section II-D). In the private
model, users do not receive any information besides the initial
public signal by the SO. In action-sharing there exists a
communication network on which users exchange their latest
consumption decisions with their immediate neighbors. In
broadcasting, the SO broadcasts the total consumption after
each time step. We assume that the customer’s power control
scheduler can adjust the load consumption between time steps
according to its preferences and information. That is, we are
interested in modeling consumption behavior for shiftable
appliances, e.g., electric vehicles, electronic devices, air con-
ditioners, etc. [11]. We formulate each consumer behavior
model and information exchange model pair as a repeated
game of incomplete information and characterize BNE be-
havior (Section IV). We use the explicit characterization to
rigorously analyze the effects of each pair of behavior and
information exchange model on demand, aggregate user utility
and welfare respectively in Sections V-VII. These sections
present analytical derivations for the results shown numeri-
cally in [12]. In addition, we provide additional simulation
results on sensitivity of the performance metrics with respect
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2to the renewable energy parameter term in the price.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. While provid-
ing more information to the consumers through action-sharing
or broadcasting models does not have a significant impact
on the expected aggregate utility or on the welfare, which is
defined as the sum of aggregate utility and the operator’s net
revenue, it reduces the uncertainty in total demand. Action-
sharing and broadcasting information exchange models even-
tually achieve the expected utility under complete information
when the communication network is connected. Furthermore,
while in a private information model increased correlation
among preferences increases the demand uncertainty, in the
broadcast model the demand variance tends to decrease with
increasing correlation. When we consider the effects of be-
havior models –selfish, altruistic, or welfare maximizers,–
we show that altruistic behavior achieves the highest ex-
pected aggregate utility and welfare maximizers achieve the
highest expected welfare. Furthermore, we characterize the
expected improvement in the considered performance metric
with respect to selfish behavior model in terms of pricing
parameters. Finally, we show that increased correlation among
user preferences tends to adversely affect aggregate utility and
welfare. We discuss the possible policy implications of these
findings for the operator and policy makers in Section VIII.
II. DEMAND RESPONSE MODEL
There are N customers, each equipped with a power
consumption scheduler. Individual power consumption of
i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N} at time h ∈ H := {1, . . . ,H} is
denoted by li,h. The total power consumed by N customers
at time h is Lh :=
∑
i∈N li,h.
A. Real-time pricing
The SO implements an adaptive pricing strategy whereby
customers are charged a slot-dependent price ph that varies
linearly with the total power consumption Lh. The SO has a
set of renewable source plants at its dispatch and incorporates
renewable generation into the pricing strategy by a random
renewable power term ωh ∈ R that depends on the amount of
renewable power produced at time slot h. The per-unit power
price in time slot h is set as
ph(Lh;ωh) =
γh
N
(Lh + ωh) (1)
where γh > 0 is a policy parameter to be determined by
the SO based on its objectives. The random variable ωh is
such that ωh = 0 when renewable sources operate at their
nominal benchmark capacity W¯h. If the realized production
exceeds this benchmark, Wh > W¯h, the SO agrees to set
−Lh < ωh < 0 to discount the energy price and to share
its revenue from the windfall. If the realized production is
below benchmark, i.e., Wh < W¯h, the SO sets ωh > 0 to
reflect the additional charge on the customers. The specific
dependence of ωh on the realized energy production and the
policy parameter, γh, are part of the supply contract between
the SO and its customers.
We assume that the SO uses a model on the renewable
power generation – see, e.g., [13] for the prediction of wind
generation – to estimate the value of ωh at the beginning
of time slot h. The mean estimate ω¯h := Eωh [ωh] of
the corresponding probability density function Pωh is made
available to all customers prior to the time slot. We do not
make any assumptions on the accuracy or the structure of
these forecasts. Inclusion of a renewable dependent term in
the price functions allows the operator to use the flexibility
of consumption behavior to compensate for peaks in con-
ventional energy reserves caused by intermittent renewable
generation [13]–[16]. We discuss its possible implications
further in Section VIII.
The operator’s price function maps the amount of en-
ergy demanded to the market price. Observe that the price
ph(Lh;ωh) at time h becomes known after the end of the time
slot. This is because price value depends on the total demand
Lh and the value of ωh which are unknown a priori. The SO
can employ the pricing policy in (1) to achieve certain system
performances, e.g., minimizing PAR, maximizing welfare,
etc., by picking its policy parameter γh > 0 [10].
B. Power consumer
User i’s consumption at time slot h, li,h, depends on his
consumption preference gi,h > 0, modeled as a random
variable that may vary across time slots. When user i con-
sumes li,h, its consumption utility increases linearly with its
preference gi,h and decreases quadratically with a constant
term αh, described as gi,hli,h − αhl2i,h. The utility of i at
time slot h ∈ H is then captured by the difference between the
consumption utility of i and the monetary cost of consumption
li,hph(Lh;ωh):
ui,h(li,h, Lh; gi,h, ωh) = −li,hph(Lh;ωh) + gi,hli,h − αhl2i,h.
(2)
Note that even if the SO’s policy parameter is set to γh = 0,
the utility of user i is maximized by li,h = gi,h/2αh. Note
that we choose αh to be homogeneous among the consumers.
Our results extend to the case where the constant αh is
heterogeneous.
The utility of user i depends on the total power, Lh,
consumed at h, which implies that it depends on the powers
that are consumed by other users in the current slot, denoted
by l−i,h := {lj,h : j ∈ N \ i}. Power consumption
of others, l−i,h, depends partly on their respective self-
preferences, i.e., preferences g−i,h := {gj,h}j 6=i, which are, in
general, unknown to user i. We assume, however, that there
is a probability density function Pgh(gh) on the vector of
self-preferences gh := [g1,h . . . gN,h]T from which these
preferences are drawn. We further assume that Pgh is normal
with mean g¯h1 where g¯h > 0 and 1 is an N × 1 vector with
one in every element, and covariance matrix Σh:
Pgh(gh) = N
(
gh; g¯h1,Σh
)
. (3)
We use the operator Egh [·] to signify expectation with respect
to Pgh and σ
h
ij to denote the (i, j)th entry of the covariance
matrix Σh. Having mean g¯h1 implies that all customers have
equal average preferences in that Egh [gi,h] = g¯h for all i.
If σhij = 0 for some pair i 6= j, it means that the self-
preferences of these customers are uncorrelated. In general,
σhij 6= 0 to account for correlated preferences due to, e.g.,
3common weather. We assume that if there is a change in the
consumption preferences from one time slot to the other, then
the self-preferences gh and gk for different time slots h 6= k
are independent.
At the beginning of time slot h, we assume that Pgh in
(3) is correctly predicted by the SO based on past data and
is announced to the customers. The SO also announces its
policy parameter γh and its expectation of the renewable term
ω¯h. In addition, each customer knows its own consumption
preference gi,h.
C. Consumer behavior models
Consumption behavior {li,h}i=1,...,N determines the popu-
lation’s aggregate utility at time h,
Uh(li,h, l−i,h) :=
∑
i
ui,h(li,h, Lh; gi,h, ωh). (4)
The net revenue of the SO is its revenue minus the cost
NRh(Lh;ωh) := ph(Lh;ωh)Lh − Ch(Lh), (5)
where Ch(Lh) is the cost of supplying Lh Watts of power.
When the generation cost per unit is constant, Ch(Lh) is a
linear function of Lh. More often, increasing the load Lh
results in increasing unit costs as the SO needs to dispatch
power from more expensive sources. This results in super-
linear cost functions with an approximate model being the
quadratic form1
Ch(Lh) =
κh
N
L2h (6)
for a given time dependent constant κh > 0 normalized
by number of consumers N . The cost in (6) has been
experimentally validated for thermal generators [20], and it
is otherwise widely accepted as a reasonable approximation
[1], [2], [6]. The welfare of the overall system at time h is
the sum of the aggregate utility with the net revenue,
Wh(li,h, l−i,h) := Uh(li,h, l−i,h) +NRh(li,h, l−i,h). (7)
Consumer behavior can be selfish, altruistic or welfare-
maximizing. User i is selfish when it wants to maximize its
individual utility in (2). It is altruistic when it considers the
well-being of other users, that is, aims to maximize Uh in
(4). Finally, user i might also consider the well-being of the
whole system and aim to choose his consumption behavior
to maximize the welfare Wh in (7) given its information.
We use the superscript Γ ∈ {S, U, W} in uΓi,h(li,h, l−i,h)
to indicate that the consumer i maximizes its selfish payoff
S, aggregate utility U or the welfare W. All of these behavior
models require strategic reasoning about the behavior of
others which constitutes a Bayesian game. Bayesian games
model interactions where users have incomplete information
about the utility of others. Below we formalize a range of
information exchange models.
D. Information models
Consumption preference profile gh is partially known by
the individuals. Consumption decisions of individuals at time
1It is possible to add linear and constant cost terms to Ch(Lh) and have
all the results in this paper still hold. We exclude these terms to simplify
notation.
h can provide valuable information about these consumption
preferences. This information is of use to consumer i in
estimating consumption for the next time slot h + 1 if the
preferences of the users do not change in that time slot, that
is, gh = gh+1. Otherwise, the information at time h is not
helpful in estimating the behaviors of others for time slot h+1
because we assume the change in the preference distribution
to be independent. We let an uninterrupted sequence of time
slots in which agents have the same consumption preference
profile define a time zone. Formally, a time zone is defined as
T = {h ∈ H : gh = g∧ ((gh−1 = g)∨ (gh+1 = g)∨g)} for
a preference profile g := [g1 . . . gN ]T with prior probability
density function Pg where ∧ is ‘and’ operator and ∨ is
‘or’ operator. Next, we present a set of possible information
exchange models within a time zone T . We use IΩi,h to denote
the set of information available to consumer i at time slot
h ∈ T for the information exchange model Ω.
Private. The information specific to consumers is the merest
possible when it consists of the private preference gi, IPi,h =
{gi} for h ∈ T .
Action-Sharing. Power control schedulers are interconnected
via a communication network represented by a graph G(N , E)
with its nodes representing the customers N = {1, . . . , N}
and edges belonging to the set E indicating the possibility
of communication. User i observes consumption levels of his
neighbors in the network Ni := {j ∈ N : (j, i) ∈ E} after
each time slot. The vector of i’s d(i) := #Ni neighbors
is denoted by [i1, . . . , id(i)]. Given the communication set-
up, the information of user i at time slot h ∈ T contains
its self-preference gi and the consumption of his neighbors
up to time h − 1, that is, IASi,h = {gi, {lNi,t}t=1,...,h−1}
where we define the actions of i’s neighbors at time t by
lNi,t := [li1,t, . . . , lid(i),t] and denote the starting time slot
of T with t = 1. We assume that the power consumption
schedulers keep the information received from neighbors
private and know the network structure G.
SO Broadcast. The SO collects all the individual consump-
tion behavior at each time h and broadcasts the total con-
sumption to all the customers, that is, IBi,h = {gi, L1:h−1}.
When the time zone T ends, we restart the information
exchange process. The prediction of renewable source term
Pωh is allowed to vary for h ∈ T . Behavior model, Γ ∈
{S, U, W}, and the information exchange model, Ω ∈ {P,
AS, B}, determine the consumption decisions of user i. In
the following, we define the rational consumer behavior in
Bayesian games within a time zone T and then character-
ize the rational behavior for each behavior and information
exchange model pair (Γ,Ω).
III. BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA
User i’s load consumption at time h ∈ T is determined by
his strategy si,h that maps his information to a consumption
level. This map depends on the belief of i which is a
conditional probability on g and ω given its information,
Pg,ω(·|IΩi,h). We use EΩi,h[·] := Eg,ω[·|IΩi,h] to indicate condi-
tional expectation with respect to its belief. While the model
can account for the correlation between the random variables
4ωh and g, we assume that they are independent. In order
to second-guess the consumption of other customers, user i
forms beliefs on preferences given the common prior Pg and
its information IΩi,h. User i’s load consumption at time h ∈ T
is determined by its strategy which is a complete contingency
plan that maps any possible local observation that it may have
to its consumption; that is, si,h : IΩi,h 7→ R+ for any IΩi,h. In
particular, for user i, its best response strategy is to maximize
its expected utility given the strategies of other customers
s−i,h := {sj,h}j 6=i,
BRΓ(IΩi,h; s−i,h) = arg max
li,h
EΩi,h
[
uΓi,h(li,h, s−i,h)
]
. (8)
Before we define the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)
solution, we introduce the following lemma which character-
izes the general form of the best response function for all the
behavior models Γ ∈ {S, U, W}.
Lemma 1 The best response strategy of i to the strategies of
others s−i,h has the following general form for any behavior
model Γ ∈ {S,U,W}
BRΓ(IΩi,h; s−i,h) =
gi − µΓhω¯h − λΓh
∑
j 6=iE
Ω
i,h[sj,h]
2(τΓh + αh)
(9)
where λΓh, µ
Γ
h, τ
Γ
h are constants that take values based on the
behavior model Γ. If Γ = S then λSh = µ
S
h = τ
S
h = γh/N .
If Γ = U then λUh = 2γh/N , µ
U
h = τ
U
h = γh/N . If Γ = W
then λWh = 2κh/N , µ
W
h = 0, τ
W
h = κh/N .
The proof follows by taking the derivative of the corre-
sponding utility with respect i’s consumption li,h, equating to
zero and solving the equality for li,h. Note that when ω¯h = 0
and γh = κh, the altruistic users have the same best response
function as the welfare-maximizers. A BNE strategy profile
for the game Γ is a strategy in which each user maximizes its
expected utility uΓi,h with respect to its own belief given that
other users also maximize their expected utility [21, Ch.6].
Definition 1 A BNE strategy sΓ := {sΓi,h}i∈N ,h∈T for the
consumer behavior model Γ ∈ {S,U,W} is such that for all
i ∈ N , h ∈ T , and {IΩi,h}i∈N ,h∈T ,
EΩi,h
[
uΓi,h(s
Γ
i,h, s
Γ
−i,h)
] ≥ EΩi,h[uΓi,h(si,h, sΓ−i,h)]. (10)
for any si,h : IΩi,h 7→ R+.
A BNE strategy (10) is computed using beliefs formed
according to Bayes’ rule. Note that the BNE strategy profile
is defined for all time slots. No user at any given time slot
within T has a profitable deviation to another strategy.
In (10), consumers estimate consumption decisions of oth-
ers to respond optimally. Equivalently, a BNE strategy is
one in which users play best response strategy given their
individual beliefs as per (8) to best response strategies of other
users – see [22], [23] for similar equilibrium concepts. As a
result, the BNE strategy is defined by the following fixed point
equations:
sΓi,h(I
Ω
i,h) = BR(I
Ω
i,h; s
Γ
−i,h) (11)
for all i ∈ N , h ∈ T , and IΩi,h. We denote i’s realized
load consumption from the equilibrium strategy sΓi,h and
information IΩi,h with l
Γ
i,h := s
Γ
i,h(I
Ω
i,h). Using the definition
in (11), we characterize the unique linear BNE strategy in
the next section for any information exchange and consumer
behavior model.
IV. CONSUMERS’ BAYESIAN GAME
It suffices for customer i to estimate the self-preference
profile g in order to estimate consumption of other users
[22]. We define the self-preference profile augmented with
mean g¯ as g˜ := [gT , g¯]T . The mean and error covariance
matrix of i’s belief at time h are denoted by EΩi,h[g˜] and
Mig˜g˜(h) := E[(g˜−EΩi,h[g˜])(g˜−EΩi,h[g˜])T ], respectively. The
next result shows that there exists a unique BNE strategy
that is a linear weighting of the mean estimate of g˜ for any
information model Ω. Furthermore, the weights of the linear
strategy are obtained by solving a set of linear equations
specific to the behavior model Γ.
Proposition 1 Consider the Bayesian game defined by the
payoff uΓi,h for Γ ∈ {S,U,W}. Let the information IΩi,h of
customer i at time h ∈ T be defined by the information
exchange model Ω ∈ {P,AS,B}. Given the normal prior
on the self-preference profile g, user i’s mean estimate of
the preference profile at time h ∈ T can be written as a
linear combination of g˜. That is, EΩi,h[g˜] = T
Ω
i,hg˜ where
TΩi,h ∈ RN+1×N+1 for all h ∈ T , and the unique equilibrium
strategy for i is linear in its estimate of the augmented self-
preference profile,
sΓi,h(I
Ω
i,h) = v
T
i,hE
Ω
i,h[g˜] + ri,h (12)
where vi,h ∈ RN+1×1 and ri,h ∈ R are the strategy
coefficients. The strategy coefficients are calculated by solving
the following set of equations for the consumer behavior
models Γ ∈ {S,U,W}
vTi,hT
ΩT
i,h + ρ
Γ
hλ
Γ
h
∑
j∈N\i
vj,hT
ΩT
i,h T
ΩT
j,h = ρ
Γ
hei, ∀ i ∈ N ,
(13)
and
ri,h + ρ
Γ
hλ
Γ
h
∑
j∈N\i
rΓj,h = −ρΓhµΓhω¯h, ∀i ∈ N , (14)
where λΓh, µ
Γ
h, τ
Γ
h are as defined in Lemma 1 for Γ ∈
{S,U,W}, ρΓh = (2(τΓh + αh))−1 and ei ∈ RN+1×1 is the
unit vector.
Proof: 2Our plan is to propose a linear strategy and use the
general form of the best response function (9) in the fixed
point equations (11) to obtain the set of linear equations. We
prove by induction. Assume that users have linear estimates
at time h, EΩi,h[g˜] = T
Ω
i,hg˜ for all i ∈ N . We propose that
users follow a strategy that is linear in their mean estimate as
in (12). Using the fixed point definition of BNE strategy in
(11), we have
vTi,hE
Ω
i,h[g˜]+ri,h =
gi − µΓhω¯h − λΓh
∑
j 6=iE
Ω
i,h[v
T
j,hE
Ω
j,h[g˜] + rj,h]
2(τΓh + αh)
(15)
2The proof is adopted from Proposition 1 in [22].
5for all i ∈ N from Lemma 1. The summation above includes
user i’s expectation of user j’s expectation of the augmented
preferences. By the induction hypothesis, we write this term
as
E[E[g˜|IΩj,h]|IΩi,h] = TΩj,hTΩi,hg˜. (16)
Substituting the above equation for the corresponding terms
in (15) and using the induction hypothesis for the expectation
term on the left-hand side yields the set of equations
vTi,hT
Ω
i,hg˜+ri,h =
gi − µΓhω¯h − λΓh
∑
j 6=i v
T
j,hT
Ω
j,hT
Ω
i,hg˜ + rj,h
2(τΓh + αh)
.
(17)
We equate the terms that multiply g˜ and the constants to
obtain the set of equations in (13) and (14), respectively.
Since user consumption is based on its BNE strategy at
time h, it is linear in its estimate of the preferences; i.e.,
lΓj,h = v
T
i,hT
Ω
i,hg˜+ri,h for all j ∈ N . We can then express the
observations of user i as a linear combination of g˜ by defining
the observation matrix HΩi,h for any information exchange
model Ω ∈ {P,AS,B}. For the private information model,
the observation matrix is zero, i.e., HPi,h = 0 for any h ∈ T .
For the action-sharing information model, the observations
of consumer i can be written using the observation matrix
HASi,h ∈ Rd(i)×N+1
HASi,h := [v
T
ji1,hT
AS
ji1,h; . . . ; v
T
jid(i),t
TASjid(i),h]
T (18)
and the vector rNi,h := [rji1,h; . . . ; rjid(i),h], as l
AS
Ni,h =
HASi,h g˜ + rNi,h. Finally, when the SO broadcasts the total
consumption LBh , the observation matrix is a vector
HBi,h =
N∑
j=1
(vTj,hT
B
j,h)
T , (19)
and the total consumption can be written as LBh = H
B
i,hg˜ +∑N
j=1 rj,h. Because the prior distribution on the preferences
are Gaussian, the observations of user i are Gaussian for all
information exchange models Ω ∈ {P,AS,B}. As a result,
we can use a Kalman filter with gain matrix
Kig˜(h) := M
i
g˜g˜(h)H
Ω
i,h
(
HΩTi,h M
i
g˜g˜(h)H
Ω
i,h
)−1
(20)
to propagate mean beliefs in the following way:
E
[
g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h+1] = E [g˜ ∣∣ IΩi,h]+Kig˜(h) (HΩTi,h g˜ −HΩTi,h TΩi,hg˜) .
(21)
We use the induction hypothesis E[g˜|IΩi,h] = TΩi,hg˜ for the
first term on the right hand side of (21) and rearrange terms
to get
E
[
g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h+1] = (TΩi,h +Kig˜(h) (HΩTi,h −HΩTi,h TΩi,h) )g˜.
(22)
Note that the mean estimate at time h + 1 is a linear
combination of g˜. Specifically, we can express the linear
weights of the mean estimate at time slot h+ 1 as
TΩi,h+1 = T
Ω
i,h +K
i
g˜(h)
(
HΩTi,h −HΩTi,h TΩi,h
)
(23)
where the mean estimate is E
[
g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h+1] = TΩi,h+1g˜, com-
pleting the induction argument. Similarly, the updates for error
covariance matrices follow standard Kalman updates [24, Ch.
12]
Mig˜g˜(h+ 1) =M
i
g˜g˜(h)−Kig˜(h)HΩTi,h Mig˜g˜(h). (24)
At the starting time slot h = 1, we have E[gj
∣∣ gi] = (1 −
σij/σii)g¯ + (σij/σii)gi. Hence the induction assumption is
true initially and EΩi,1[g˜] = E[g˜
∣∣ gi] = TΩi1g˜ for all Ω ∈
{P,AS,B}.
Since the stage game has the same pay-off structure and the
information is Gaussian, it suffices to show uniqueness for the
stage game. The uniqueness of the stage game is proven in
Proposition 1 in [10]. See also Proposition 2.1 in [25].
Proposition 1 presents how BNE consumption strategies
are computed at each time slot. Accordingly, the scheduler
repeatedly determines its consumption strategy given con-
sumption behavior model Γ and available information, re-
ceives information based on the information exchange model
Ω at the end of the time slot, and propagates its beliefs on
self-preference profile to be used in the next time slot. For
each consumption behavior Γ ∈ {S, U, W} the user solves a
different set of equations in (13)-(14) derived from the fixed
point equations of the BNE (11). For Private information
exchange model, users do not receive any new information
within the horizon hence their mean estimate of g˜ do not
change, that is, TPi,h = T
P
i,1 for h ∈ T , which implies the
set of equations (13)-(14) need to be solved only once at
the beginning to determine the strategy for the whole time
horizon. For Action-Sharing information exchange model,
upon observing actions of its neighbors, user i has new
relevant information about the preference profile which it can
use to better predict the total consumption in future steps.
Similarly in SO Broadcast model, each user receives the total
consumption at each time which is useful in estimating total
consumption in the following time slot.
The Bayesian belief propagation for Gaussian prior beliefs
corresponds to Kalman filter updates at each step for any
information exchange model. In particular, beliefs remain
Gaussian and the mean estimates are linear combinations
of private signals at all times for any information exchange
model. In order to compute the BNE strategy, it does not
suffice for scheduler i to form beliefs on the preference g˜.
It also needs to keep track of beliefs of others. Knowing
the estimate of all the other schedulers is not possible for i.
However, this is not required to compute an estimate of other
schedulers’ estimates. It is only required that user i knows
how other schedulers compute their mean estimates which
implies knowing the estimation weights TΩj,h. Even though
scheduler i does not know Pg˜(g˜|IΩj,h), it can keep track of
TΩj,h via the weight recursion equation in (23), which can
be computed using public information. Note that i cannot
compute self-mean estimate of preferences, E
[
g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h], via
multiplying TΩi,h by g˜ since this computation would require
knowledge of g˜. Instead, user i computes its mean estimate
by a Kalman filter. We detail the local computations of a
scheduler in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, we provide a local algorithm for user i to
compute its consumption level and propagate its belief given a
behavior model Γ ∈ {S, U, W} and the information exchange
6model Ω = AS. We point to modifications specific to the
other information exchange models here in our explanation.
User i initializes its belief on g˜ at the beginning of the time
zone T according to the preference distribution in (3). It also
determines the estimation weights TΩj,1 and error covariance
matrix Mjg˜g˜(1) at the beginning for j ∈ N . Note that user
i does not need any local information from other users in
this initialization. Using the estimation weights {TΩj,1}j∈N ,
it can locally construct the equations in (13) and (14), and
solve for the strategy coefficients {vj,h, rj,h}j∈N . In Step 2,
i consumes the amount based on its local estimate of the
augmented self-preferences – see (12).
Once the consumption occurs, the information becomes
available according to the information exchange model Ω.
At this point, if the upcoming time slot h + 1 has the same
prior preference distribution (3) as h, that is, if h + 1 ∈ T ,
i propagates its belief on the self-preference profile given
the new information. The propagation of beliefs starts by
computing observation matrices of all the users in Step 3
based on the information exchange model Ω. When the model
is action-sharing, Ω = AS, each observed action {lASj,h}j∈Ni
is a linear combination of g˜ with the observation matrix
HASj,h computed by (18). If the model is broadcast, Ω =
B, the observation matrix is a vector computed by (19). If
the model is private, Ω = P, there is no new information
available hence scheduler i goes back to Step 2 with the same
strategy coefficients. Next, i uses these observation matrices
in computing the gain matrices in Step 4 of all the users.
In Step 5, i propagates the estimation weights TBj,h+1 and
error covariance matrix Mjg˜g˜(h + 1). Note that in Steps 3-5
user i does a full network simulation in which it emulates the
Kalman filter estimates of everyone using public information,
that is, estimation weights {TΩj,h}j∈N , strategy coefficients
{vj,h}j∈N and network topology G. Finally in Step 6, i
propagates its own mean estimate E
[
g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h+1] by using its
own local observation, which is lΓNi,h for Ω = AS or L
Γ
h for
Ω = B.
A. Private and complete information games
In Step 2 of Algorithm 1 the user solves a set of N2 linear
equations. This computation can be avoided in situations
where the information of each consumer remains the same.
The information is static in the two extreme cases. The first
extreme case is when the information exchange model is
private (Ω = P). For the private information case, there exists
a closed-form solution to the set of equations in (13)-(14) that
is symmetric when the preference correlation is homogeneous.
We state this result in the following.
Proposition 2 Consider the Bayesian game defined by the
payoff uΓi,h for Γ ∈ {S,U,W} and the the private information
exchange model Ω = P. Assume the preferences of users are
σ-correlated at time h, that is, the off-diagonal elements of
Σ are the same σij = σ ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 1, . . . , N and
j ∈ {1, . . . , N}\i and its diagonal elements equal to 1. Then,
the unique BNE strategy of user i is linear in ω¯h, g¯h, gi,h for
Γ ∈ {S,U,W} such that
sΓi,h(I
P
i,h) = a
Γ
h(gi,h − g¯h) + bΓh(g¯h − ω¯hµΓh) (25)
Algorithm 1 Sequential Game Filter for Ω = AS at User i
Require: Consumer behavior model Γ ∈ {S, U, W}.
Require: Posterior distribution on g˜ at time slot h = 1 and
{TΩj,1,Mjg˜g˜(1)}j∈N according to (3).
while gh = g do
[1] Equilibrium Γ: Solve {vj,h, rj,h}j∈N using (13)-
(14).
[2] Play: Compute sΓi,h(I
Ω
i,h) = v
T
i,hE[g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h] + ri,h.
[3] Construct observation matrix {HΩj,h}j∈N : Use (18).
[4] Gain matrices: Compute {Kjg˜(h)}j∈N
Kjg˜(h) := M
j
g˜g˜(h)H
Ω
j,h
(
HΩTj,hM
j
g˜g˜(h)H
Ω
j,h
)−1
[5] Estimation weights: Update {Tj,h+1,Mjg˜g˜(h +
1)}j∈N
Tj,h+1 = T
Ω
j,h + K
j
g˜(h)
(
HΩTj,h −HΩTj,hTΩj,h
)
Mjg˜g˜(h+ 1) =M
j
g˜g˜(h)−Kjg˜(h)HΩTj,hMjg˜g˜(h).
[6] Bayesian estimates: Calculate E[g˜
∣∣ IΩi,h+1]
E[g˜
∣∣IΩi,h+1] =E [g˜ ∣∣ IΩi,h]+Kig˜(h)(lΓNi,h−E[lΓNi,h ∣∣ IΩi,h]).
end while
where we define constants aΓh = ρ
Γ
h(1 + λ
Γ
hρ
Γ
hσ(N − 1))−1,
bΓh = ρ
Γ
h(1 + λ
Γ
hρ
Γ(N − 1))−1, and ρΓh = (2(τΓh + αh))−1.
Proof: See Proposition 1 and 2 in [10] for the proof of the
selfish case (Γ = S). Proofs for the other cases follow the
same steps where we consider the best response function in
(9) of the corresponding behavior model.
Second extreme case of static information is when all the
users have complete information. For the game we consider,
for each customer, his private preference and the cumulative
realized preference {gi,
∑
j gj,h} form a sufficient statistic of
the realized preferences g for the homogeneously correlated
preference games Γ ∈ {S, U, W} – see [26]. Next we provide
an explicit characterization of BNE strategies when users have
complete information.
Proposition 3 Consider the Bayesian game defined by the
payoff uΓi,h for Γ ∈ {S,U,W}. Let the information of
customer i at time h ∈ T be Ii,h = {gi,
∑
j gj,h}. Assume
the preferences of users are σ-correlated at time h as defined
in Proposition 2. Then, the unique BNE strategy of user i is
linear in ω¯h,
∑
j gj,h, gi,h for all h ∈ H such that
sΓi,h(I
B
i,h) = a
Γ
h(gi,h −
1
N
N∑
j=1
gj,h) + b
Γ
h(
1
N
N∑
j=1
gj,h − ω¯hµΓh)
(26)
where we define constants aΓh = ρ
Γ
h(1−λΓhρΓh)−1, bΓh = ρΓh(1+
λΓhρ
Γ
h(N − 1))−1 and ρΓh = (2(τΓh + αh))−1.
Proof: Proof follows along the similar lines of the proof of
Proposition 2.
Complete information is achieved when the SO broadcasts
total consumption Lh and the preference correlation is ho-
7mogeneous. That is, the total consumption Lh conveys the
cumulative realized preference
∑
j gj when the preferences
are homogeneously correlated. Thus, in the broadcast infor-
mation exchange model, Ω = B, consumers play a private
information game in the first time slot, and they have complete
information from the second slot onwards.
These characterizations allow for computation of BNE
behavior by putting the available information into the linear
strategy functions instead of following the steps of Algorithm
1. In the following sections, these characterizations allow for
analytical comparison of performance measures with respect
to different behavior and information exchange models.
V. EFFECTS OF BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE
MODELS ON DEMAND
We first focus on the effect private and complete infor-
mation models have on demand. In both of these cases
information is static. Hence it suffices to focus on demand
at a given time h for comparison. In the following, we drop
the h sub-index from the notation until we consider the action-
sharing information exchange model. We define demand for a
consumer behavior model Γ ∈ {S,U,W} as LΓ = ∑Nj=1 sΓj .
For the private and complete information cases, when the
preferences are σ-correlated, the expected consumption of
individuals are the same as per (25) and (26). Moreover, both
the private and complete information models have the same
expected total consumption,
E[LΓ/N ] = E[sΓi (I
P
i )] = E[s
Γ
i (I
B
i )] = b
Γ(g¯ − ω¯µΓ) (27)
by the fact that bΓ has the same value in Propositions 2 and
3. This means that allowing users to exchange information
does not alter the demand forecasts of the operator. We can
also read from the expected demand above that a welfare-
maximizing user is not impacted by the changes in ω¯ because
µW = 0. On the other hand, consumption of selfish and
altruistic users decreases with slope bΓµΓ as the renewable
term ω¯ increases.
Given the explicit expected demand above, we compare the
effects of different consumer behavior models. Throughout the
analysis, we assume the preferences are σ-correlated where
the diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are equal to 1
and off-diagonal elements are equal to 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
Corollary 1 For large number of consumers, N , we have
1) E[sSi ]/E[s
U
i ] = 2(γ + α)/(γ + 2α) > 1.
2) If ω¯ = 0 then E[sWi ]/E[s
U
i ] = (γ+α)/(κ+α), which
is greater than 1 for γ > κ.
3) If ω¯ = 0 then E[sSi ]/E[s
W
i ] = 2(κ + α)/(γ + 2α),
which is greater than 1 for γ < 2κ.
Proof: When N is large, we can approximate the bΓ behavior
constants given in Proposition 2 as bS ≈ (γ + 2α)−1, bU ≈
(2(γ + α))−1 and bW ≈ (2(κ + α))−1. The comparisons
follow from (27).
The above result says that the expected consumption of
a selfish individual is higher than an altruistic user. Further-
more, the ordering of expected consumptions follow E[sSi ] >
E[sWi ] > E[s
U
i ] when κ < γ < 2κ. This range of price
parameter γ is of importance because the realized rate of
return of the operator is approximately γ/κ. Hence, the
operator is likely to select the pricing policy γ from this range
[10].
Next, we consider demand variance as an indicator of
uncertainty that an operator has in its demand forecast. We
first focus on the private information model.
Corollary 2 Consider the Ω = P information model with σ-
correlated preferences. We have the variance of normalized
demand LΓ/N =
∑N
j=1 s
Γ
i (I
P
i )/N as follows:
V ar(LΓ/N) =
1 + (N − 1)σ
N
(aΓ)2, (28)
where aΓ is as defined in Proposition 2.
Proof : From the definition of the variance of normalized
demand, we have
V ar(LΓ/N) :=
(
E[(
N∑
j=1
sΓi (I
P
i ))
2]− E[(
N∑
j=1
sΓi (I
P
i ))]
2
)
/N2
= E
[( N∑
j=1
aΓ(gi − g¯)
)2]
/N2.
In the second equality we use (25) to cancel out the squared
mean of consumption. The result follows from the above
equation.
Given the explicit representation of variance, we can make
the following comparison about the effects of consumption
behavior models on demand uncertainty.
Corollary 3 Consider the Ω = P information model with σ-
correlated preferences. For large number of consumers, N ,
we have:
1) V ar(LΓ/N) ≈ σ(NλΓσ + 2α)−2, where λΓ is as
defined in Lemma 1 for Γ = {S,U,W}.
2)
∂V ar(LΓ/N)
∂σ
=
2α−NλΓσ
(NλΓσ + 2α)3
. (29)
3) If σ = 0, then the variance of normalized demand is
the same for all behavior models Γ = {S,U,W}.
4) If σ ∈ (0, 1], then 1 < V ar(LS/N)/V ar(LU/N) < 4.
5) If σ ∈ (0, 1], then V ar(LU/N)/V ar(LW /N) =
(α+κσ)2
(α+γσ)2 which is less than 1 for γ > κ.
Proof: When N is large, we have the constant aΓ ≈ (NλΓσ+
2α)−1 from Proposition 2 where λΓ is as defined in Lemma
1. The comparisons follow from (28).
Equation (29) shows that, with increasing σ, the demand
variance grows as long as NλΓσ < 2α while it decreases with
increasing σ when NλΓσ > 2α. Furthermore, the change
in variance slows as σ becomes larger. From the fourth
observation we see that selfish behavior achieves a higher
demand variance in comparison to altruistic behavior. Next
we focus on the demand variance in the complete information
case that is reached after the operator broadcasts the total
consumption information.
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Fig. 1. Total consumption over time for Γ =S and Ω ∈ {P, AS, B} for
N = {3, 5, 10, 15} population size. There is a single time zone T which
lasts for H = 5 hours. The cost function constant κh = 1 for h ∈ T . The
price policy parameter is chosen as γh = 1.2$/kWh2 for all time slots. The
communication network is determined by randomly placing N individuals
on a 3-mile×5-mile area and connecting them if they are closer than the
threshold connectivity of 2 miles. The diameter number under each figure
indicates the network diameter. We let the decay parameter in (2) be αh = 1
for h ∈ T . The mean of the preferences gi is equal to 30 for i ∈ N . We
let the standard deviation of the preference to be identical for all consumers
as σii = 4 and we assume preferences are uncorrelated, σij = 0. We let
the renewable power term ω be normal-distributed with mean ω¯h = 0 and
variance σω = 2. When the network is connected, AS converges to the B in
the number of steps equal to the network diameter.
Corollary 4 Consider the complete information model with
σ-correlated preferences. We have the variance of LΓ/N as
V ar(LΓ/N) =
N − 1
N2
(aΓ)2, (30)
where aΓ is as defined in Proposition 3.
Proof : From the definition of the variance of normalized
demand,
V ar(LΓ/N) := (E
[
(
N∑
j=1
sΓi (I
B
i ))
2
]− E[( N∑
j=1
sΓi (I
B
i ))
]2
)/N2
= E
[( N∑
j=1
aΓ(gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj)
)2]
/N2
=
(aΓ)2
N2
(
NE
[
(gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj)
2
]
+N(N − 1)E
[
(gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj)(gk − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj)
])
.
(31)
In the second step we substitute the consumption decisions of
individuals from (26) and cancel out the mean of consumption
squared. The third step expands the quadratic sum where
we have k 6= i in the last equality. Now consider the first
expectation inside the last equality above:
E
[(
gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj
)2]
=
N − 1
N
(1− σ). (32)
The second expectation inside (31) is
E
[(
gi − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj
)(
gk − 1
N
N∑
j=1
gj
)]
=
1
N
σ. (33)
The result follows by substituting the above two identities into
(31) and then simplifying the terms. We have
the following observations for the variance of demand in the
complete information case.
Corollary 5 Consider the complete information model with
σ-correlated preferences. For large number of consumers, N ,
1) V ar(LΓ/N) ≈ 0 for any model Γ = {S,U,W}.
2) The change of variance with respect to σ is zero.
Proof: When N is large, we have the constant aΓ ≈ (2α)−1
from Proposition 3 for any Γ ∈ {S,U,W}. The observations
above follow when we substitute this approximation in (30).
The results above are in sharp contrast to the observations
given by items 1 and 2 of Corollary 3 for the variance
of demand in the private information model. In summary,
while giving information to the consumers does not affect
the expected demand as per (27), it reduces the uncertainty
in demand forecasts.
So far, we have compared the private information and
complete information cases. As aforementioned, complete in-
formation is achieved after the first time step in the broadcast
information exchange model during a time zone. In the action-
sharing information exchange model, we expect to observe
effects on demand similar to the complete information case.
However, an analytical comparison between Ω = AS and
Ω = P is not possible because we do not have a closed form
solution to the consumption behavior when Ω = AS as per
Proposition 1.
In the sequel, we numerically analyze the effects of the
action-sharing information exchange model on expected con-
sumption and its variance. Note that in the action-sharing (AS)
information exchange model, we need to consider multiple
time steps in a time zone to measure the effects of infor-
mation. In AS, consumers follow the steps in Algorithm 1
to compute their BNE strategies. Figs. 1(a)-(d) exhibit the
total consumption with respect to hours for the population
sizes N = {3, 5, 10, 15}, respectively. Given a population
size plot, each line corresponds to a different information
exchange model for the selfish consumer behavior model –
see the legend in Fig. 1(b). We observe that when the network
is connected (Figs. 1(b)-(d)), the total consumption in AS
model converges to the total consumption in the B model.
Furthermore, convergence time is proportional to the diameter
of the network. When the network is not connected (Fig. 1(a)),
convergence does not necessarily happen. Finally, we compare
the normalized demand variance for the cases considered in
Fig. 1 in Table I. As expected, the AS model has a demand
variance that is smaller than the private information model
but larger than the broadcast model.
9N
3 5 10 15
P 3.5 1.7 1.2 1.1
AS 3 1.1 0.7 0.6
B 2.1 0.9 0.5 0.5
TABLE I
NORMALIZED DEMAND VARIANCE WITH SELFISH CONSUMERS FOR THE
SET-UP IN FIGURE 1
VI. EFFECTS OF BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION
EXCHANGE MODELS ON AGGREGATE UTILITY
We begin by comparing the effects of private and complete
information models on aggregate utility. In both of cases,
behavior is static. Hence we focus on demand at a fixed hour
and remove the sub-index h from the notation. We then give
an explicit characterization of the expected aggregate utility
for the symmetric BNE strategies of the form given by (25)
or (26).
Lemma 2 For the symmetric BNE strategies of the form si =
a(gi − g¯) + bg¯, we have the following characterization of
normalized expected aggregate utility when ω¯ = 0:
E[U ]
N
=
(
b− (γ + α)b2)g¯2 −(N − 1
N
γσ+
γ
N
+ α
)
a2 + a.
(34)
Proof: From the definition of aggregate utility U in (4) and
the definition of individual utility, we have
E[U ]
N
=
1
N
E
[ N∑
i=1
si
(
− γ
N
( N∑
j=1
sj + ω¯
))
+ gisi − αs2i
]
.
(35)
From the above relationship there are three expectation terms
we need to compute. The first term is given by
E
[
si
N∑
j=1
sj
]
= E
[(
a(gi − g¯) + bg¯
)(
a
N∑
j=1
(gj − g¯) +Nbg¯
)]
= a2
(
1 + (N − 1)σ)+Nb2g¯2. (36)
The second term is
E[sigi] = a+ bg¯
2. (37)
The third expectation is
E[s2i ] = E[(a(gi − g¯) + b(g¯))2] = a2 + b2g¯2. (38)
Combining the three terms above in (35), we have
E[U ]
N
=
1
N
(
−N γ
N
(
a2(1 + (N − 1)σ) +Nb2g¯2)
+N(a+ bg¯2)− αN(a2 + b2g¯2)
)
. (39)
Reorganizing and simplifying gives the desired result.
We compare the effects of private and complete information
exchange models on aggregate utility next.
Corollary 6 Consider the private and complete information
models for σ-correlated preferences for large number of
consumers, N .
1) The expected normalized aggregate utility is larger in
the private information model than in the complete
information model.
2) The difference in expected normalized aggregate utilities
between the two information models becomes negligible
as g¯ increases.
Proof : For large N in private information case, aΓ ≈
(NλΓσ + 2α)−1 from Proposition 2, where λΓ is as defined
in Lemma 1. For large N in the complete information case,
aΓ ≈ (2α)−1 from Proposition 3 for any Γ. In addition, the bΓ
term is the same for both private and complete information
models. The first observation is established by substituting
these constants for the BNE behavior of both private (25)
and complete information (26) models in (34) and taking the
difference. The second relationship is deduced by noting that
when g¯ increases, while the expected utility in (34) increases,
the difference between the two models remains the same
because the constant b is the same for both models.
The results above imply that at high mean consumption
preference, the broadcast information has negligible effect on
aggregate utility. We now compare the effects of behavior
models.
Corollary 7 Consider the private and complete information
models for σ-correlated preferences. We have the following
relations in terms of the normalized expected aggregate utility
for large N and g¯ for both information models:
1) The ratio of expected aggregate utility when consumers
act selfish versus altruistic is given by
E[US ]
E[UU ]
=
4α2 + 4αγ
4α2 + 4αγ + γ2
. (40)
That is, altruist behavior achieves a strictly higher
aggregate utility.
2) The ratio of expected aggregate utility when consumers
act as welfare maximizers versus altruistic is given by
E[UW ]
E[UU ]
=
(γ + α)(2κ+ α− γ)
(κ+ α)2
, (41)
which is strictly less than 1 for any parameter value
γ 6= κ.
Proof : Note that for large N , we have bS ≈ (γ + 2α)−1,
bU ≈ (2(γ + α))−1 and bW ≈ (2(κ + α))−1 for both the
private and complete information models. Proof follows by
substituting the related constants of the behavior models in
(34) and only considering terms that multiply g¯2.
As expected altruistic behavior model attains a higher
aggregate utility than any other consumer behavior model
regardless of the information exchange model. Furthermore,
the ratio of increase in (40) when compared to selfish behavior
increases as the price policy parameter γ increases. We
next consider the impact of changes in σ-correlation on the
expected aggregate utility.
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Fig. 2. Effect of mean estimate of renewable energy ω¯ on aggregate utility
per capita EU/N . We let N = 30. The renewable term ω¯ takes values in
{−3,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, 3} and the preference correlation is fixed at σij = 2.4.
The other constants are as defined in Fig. 1. We consider 100 instantiations of
the random variables g and ω. We compute the expected values of aggregate
utility by taking an average of all runs for a given ω¯.
Corollary 8 Consider the private and complete information
models for σ-correlated preferences.
1) When information is private and N is large, the sensitiv-
ity of expected aggregate utility to correlation constant
σ is negative for models Γ = {S,U} and for Γ = W
when κ > γ/2. In addition, the decrease in aggregate
utility with respect to σ slows as σ grows.
2) When information is complete and N is large, the
sensitivity of expected aggregate utility is given by
∂E[U ]/N
∂σ
= − γ
4α2
< 0. (42)
Proof : Note that b terms in (34) do not depend on σ. The
results follow by substituting the values of aΓ terms when N
is large for the corresponding information model in (34) and
then taking the derivative with respect to σ.
The above results show that the increasing correlation
among user consumption preferences decreases aggregate user
utility irrespective of the information model.
Lastly, we consider the effect of the reported mean estimate
of the renewable energy term ω¯ in (1) on aggregate utility.
In Fig. 2, we plot normalized expected aggregate utility per
capita E[U ]/N with respect to ω¯ ∈ [−3, 3]. We observe
private (dashed line) and complete (solid line) information
models have negligible difference in E[U ]/N for a given
behavior model as per Corollary 6. Aggregate utility decreases
for all behavior and information exchange models as ω¯
increases. While the slope of decrease is the same for selfish
and aggregate utility maximizers, this decrease is slightly
faster for welfare maximizers.
We compared the effects of behavior models in the con-
text of the two static information exchange models. Results
indicate that the expected aggregate utility is not affected by
the information that users may be given. We also explicitly
characterized the extent of the effect of consumer behavior
models on aggregate utility, and concluded that consumer
behavior models are the primary determinant of expected
aggregate utility. We confirm this intuition by considering the
average aggregate utility from an ensemble of runs in the set-
up of Fig. 1.
VII. EFFECTS OF BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION
EXCHANGE MODELS ON WELFARE
We follow a similar path as the previous section. We focus
on the two extreme information models, private and complete,
when consumers have static information. Hence, we remove
the time sub-index. The following result provides an explicit
characterization of the expected welfare for symmetric BNE
strategies.
Lemma 3 For the symmetric BNE strategies of the form si =
a(gi − g¯) + bg¯, we have the following characterization of
normalized expected welfare when ω¯ = 0:
E[W ]
N
=
(
b− (κ+α)b2)g¯2−(N − 1
N
κσ+
κ
N
+α
)
a2 + a.
(43)
Proof: Recall the definition of welfare W in (7) and note that
E[W ]/N is equal to (35) when we replace γ with κ and let
ω¯ = 0 in (35). The rest follows along the same lines as in the
proof of Lemma 2.
The effects of information models, private or complete,
are similar to the results for aggregate utility in Corollary 6
as the functional form of welfare in (43) is identical. That
is, for large N , the private information model is slightly
preferable. If the mean preference g¯ is large in comparison
to the decay parameter α, the information models have a
negligible effect on welfare. Next, we compare the impact
of consumer behavior models.
Corollary 9 Consider the private and complete information
models for σ-correlated preferences. We have the following
relationships in terms of the normalized expected welfare for
large N and g¯ in both information models:
1) The ratio of expected welfare when consumers act
selfish versus welfare-maximizing is
E[WS ]
E[WW ]
=
4α2 + 4αγ + 4κ(γ − κ)
4α2 + 4αγ + γ2
. (44)
That is, welfare-maximizing behavior achieves a strictly
higher welfare except when they are equal at γ = 2κ.
2) The ratio of expected welfare when consumers act
altruistic versus welfare-maximizing is
E[WU ]
E[WW ]
=
(κ+ α)(2γ + α− κ)
(γ + α)2
, (45)
which is strictly less than 1 for any parameter value
except when welfares are equal at γ = κ.
Proof : Note that for large N , we have bS ≈ (γ + 2α)−1,
bU ≈ (2(γ + α))−1 and bW ≈ (2(κ + α))−1 for both the
private and complete information models. Proof follows by
substituting the related constants of the behavior models in
(43) and only considering terms that multiply g¯2. To prove
that (44) is less than 1, we need to show that γ2 > 4κ(γ−κ).
Observe that this relationship is equivalent to (γ − 2κ)2 > 0,
which is true except for γ = 2κ. Similarly, showing that (45)
is less than 1 amounts to 2κγ − γ2 < κ2. This is equivalent
to (κ− γ)2 > 0, which is true if κ 6= γ.
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As expected, welfare-maximizing behavior attains a higher
welfare than any other consumer behavior model regardless
of the information exchange model. Furthermore, the ratio of
increase in (44), when compared to selfish behavior, grows as
the price policy parameter γ increases. Next we consider the
effect of σ-correlation on expected welfare.
Corollary 10 Consider the private and complete information
models for σ-correlated preferences.
1) When information is private and N is large, the sen-
sitivity of expected welfare to correlation constant σ is
negative if α > γ and γ > κ. In addition, the decrease
in welfare with respect to σ slows as σ grows.
2) When information is complete and N is large, the
sensitivity of welfare is given by
∂E[W ]/N
∂σ
= − κ
4α2
< 0. (46)
Proof: Note that the b terms in (43) do not depend on σ. The
results follow by substituting the values of aΓ terms when N
is large for the corresponding information model in (43) and
then taking the derivative with respect to σ.
The above results show that increasing correlation among
user consumption preferences decreases welfare irrespective
of the information model.
Lastly, we consider the effect of reported mean estimate of
the renewable energy term ω¯ in (1) on welfare. In Fig. 3, we
plot expected normalized welfare E[W ]/N with respect to
ω¯ ∈ [−3, 3]. We observe private (dashed lines) and complete
(solid lines) information models have negligible differences
in E[W ]/N for a given behavior model. E[W ]/N does not
change for welfare maximizers because users do not respond
to changes is ω¯. E[W ]/N increases for selfish users while it
decreases for aggregate utility maximizers. To see why, recall
Corollary 1 from which we have E[sSi ] > E[s
W
i ] > E[s
U
i ] for
κ < γ < 2κ. When ω¯ increases, E[sSi ] decreases by (27) and
gets closer to E[sWi ] causing the increase of E[W ]/N . When
ω¯ increases, E[sUi ] decreases and moves away from E[s
W
i ]
causing the decrease of E[W ]/N . Considering the drop in
expected aggregate utility of selfish users in Fig. 2, increasing
ω¯ implies a higher revenue for the operator when users are
selfish because welfare is the sum of aggregate utility and net
revenue in (7).
We compared the effects of behavior models in the context
of the two static information exchange models. In sum, the
results indicate that the expected welfare is not affected by
the information that users may be given. We also explicitly
characterized the extent to which consumer behavior models
affected expected welfare. Since the latter are the primary
determinants of expected welfare, we expect the action-
sharing information exchange model to perform similar to the
private and broadcasting information exchange models.
VIII. DISCUSSION
We proposed a demand response management model based
on the real-time pricing scheme where an operator responsible
for supplying electricity to a set of consumers employed real-
time demand dependent price. The pricing function is such
that it linearly increases with total consumption per capita
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Fig. 3. Effect of mean estimate of renewable energy ω¯ on welfare per
capita EW/N . The renewable term ω¯ takes values in {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2} and
the correlation coefficient is fixed at σij = 2.4. The other constants are as
defined in Fig. 1. We consider 100 instantiations of the random variables g
and ω.
and decreases with increasing renewable energy generation
in the time slot. This and other RTP policies proposed in
the literature [27] allow the operator to shape consumer
behavior in order to improve system level performances, e.g.,
demand uncertainty reduction, welfare maximization, PAR
minimization, etc. However, the implications and the extent
of the success of the RTP policies depend on consumer
behavior, as well as information consumers have, which are
unknown to the SO. This paper provided an extensive analysis
of the sensitivity of the system performance measures to
consumer behavior and information under an RTP mechanism.
Our results illustrated that communication among consumers
reduced demand uncertainty and showed the extent to which
the flexibility that an RTP mechanism provides in managing
shiftable demand of the consumers could impact system
performance.
From the perspective of the SO, giving information to the
consumers is beneficial in that it reduces demand uncertainty
which can reduce the conventional energy reserves held for
worst case scenarios. Furthermore, our results on sensitivity
of demand and welfare on the renewable energy term in the
price provide clear tradeoffs to be considered by the SO.
On one hand, renewable energy term can shape shiftable
consumption according to the abundance or the scarcity of
renewables. On the other hand, these manipulations cause
significant changes to the aggregate user utility. From the
perspective of a regulator, who is responsible for the well-
being of the system and consumers, the relationship estab-
lished between the expected aggregate consumer utility when
users are altruistic and the expected aggregate consumer utility
when users are selfish provides insight on the harm caused by
the RTP mechanism parameters to the consumers. Moreover,
the relationship between the expected welfares when users
are selfish versus welfare-maximizing provides a guideline
on how to select pricing policy parameters based on system
cost parameters to maximize expected welfare. These insights
can guide limitations that the regulator can put to the SO’s
RTP policy. Lastly, the illustrated positive effects of giving
additional information to the consumers is a push toward
investing in a communication network of smart meters among
consumers. From the perspective of consumers that are self-
interested, these results show that sharing their information
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will not have adverse effects in expected utility.
It should be observed that the aforementioned implications
depend on specific modeling choices, namely, on the demand
side the assumption of Bayesian information processing, and
on the supply side the use of a quadratic form for the SO’s
cost. These choices may be simplistic. But in the following we
claim that the results outlined here still provide meaningful
guidelines if these restrictions are lifted. On the demand side,
with regard to the model of Bayesian information processing,
we remark that this is a benchmark model of information
processing, and in our analysis we consider the two extremes
of consumer information access, namely, private and complete
information. The analysis of the two extreme cases provide
the range of results we can expect from the performance
measures in an information sharing consumer model. Hence,
if we are to consider another information sharing model that
is not Bayesian and has a lower computational complexity,
e.g. [28], we would expect our insights to be similar to the
action-sharing model considered here as long as the proposed
model aggregates information approximately correctly. As
for the use of quadratic energy costs on the supply side,
it is better to consider a model in which the cost for each
device can be modeled as a linear function of the power
dispatched from each device. In this case the cost model is
an increasing piecewise linear function of total consumption
as power is dispatched from more costly generators with
increasing total consumption [16]. The quadratic cost function
is a tractable approximation for the piecewise linear cost
function and captures the fundamental property that higher
energy production requires dispatching from more costly
sources. The quantitative specifics may change for piecewise
linear functions but the qualitative conclusions will be similar.
A prominent feature of the vision for the electricity grid of
the future is that consumers play an active role in balancing
supply and demand through communication with the operator
and amongst the consumers themselves. Furthermore, the grid
of the future should be cleaner by allowing for increased
renewable energy penetration. In order to attain this vision, we
need to address two main challenges. First, making consumers
active entities in balancing demand and supply can have
unintended consequences such as increasing uncertainty in the
system, and thus inflating environmental and monetary costs
[8], [9]. Second, we have to address the fact that renewables
are inherently intermittent and hard to predict, and hence,
if not dealt with systematically, can increase the need for
conventional energy reserves defying their primary purpose.
This paper took a step in the direction to overcome these
challenges in order to realize the vision for the electricity
grid.
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